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Abstract
After storm-related power outages, many have recommended municipalizing 
investor-owned utilities, claiming that profit-making utilities have insufficient 
incentive to prepare for storms. I provide empirical evidence that municipal 
utilities spend more on maintenance of their distribution network than investor- 
owned utilities. Nonetheless, I find that storms significantly disrupt electricity 
consumption in areas served by municipal utilities but do not disrupt areas 
served by investor-owned utilities. These results are based on a stratified random 
sample of 241 investor-owned, 96 cooperative, and 94 municipal utilities in the 
United States between 1999 and 2012. I conclude that municipal utilities’ in-
efficiencies are more important in causing power outages than investor-owned 
utilities’ disincentives to spend on maintenance.
1. Introduction
In the 1990s, many governments introduced market forces to the electricity- 
generating industry. Some countries also privatized electric distribution. For in-
stance, in 1990, all of the electric distribution companies in England and Wales 
were privatized. Similarly, in Australia, all of the distribution companies in the 
states of Victoria and South Australia were privatized in 1995 and 2001. In con-
trast, in the United States the share of residential customers served by govern-
ment utilities remains unchanged (15 percent in 1990 and 14 percent in 2011). 
Further, municipal utilities continue to receive a variety of subsidies: federal in-
come tax exemption, federal income tax exemption on debt issued by utilities, 
and lower prices for federal hydropower. Finally, the press reports calls to mu-
nicipalize investor-owned utilities rather than calls to privatize municipal utilities 
(Singer 2012; Cardwell 2013; Bruun 2009; Janoski 2012).
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One of the main arguments for municipalization is the alleged poor perfor-
mance of investor-owned utilities after major storms.1 Following Hurricane 
Irene, many customers of investor-owned Connecticut Light and Power were 
without electricity for 11 days, while customers of municipal utilities in Con-
necticut experienced only brief power outages (Singer 2012). Similarly, in Mas-
sachusetts, municipal utilities in some of the hardest-hit areas were able to re-
store power in a day or two, while investor-owned utilities like NStar took a week 
(Cardwell 2013).2 The press has argued that these extended outages are due to 
investor-owned utilities skimping on maintenance to pay higher dividends. For 
instance, prior to Hurricane Irene, Connecticut Light and Power spent $78 per 
customer on maintenance, while the municipal utility in Norwich, Connecti-
cut, spent $132 (Cox 2011).3 However, I am not aware of any empirical analysis 
that confirms that investor-owned utilities spend less on storm preparedness or 
are more likely to suffer power outages following storms. I seek to fill this gap 
by examining whether the mode of ownership of an electric utility affects these 
quality- of-service measures.
First, I examine storm-preparedness expenditures in a sample of 179 investor- 
owned, 801 cooperative, and 1,437 municipal electric utilities in the United States 
for 1995–2002. Most discussion about storm preparedness has focused on main-
taining electric distribution lines (for example, regularly cutting tree branches 
near power lines) and burying power lines underground. I find that, per line mile, 
municipal utilities spend more on maintaining their distribution network than 
investor-owned utilities. However, the higher expenditures by municipal utilities 
could indicate greater inefficiency rather than greater storm preparedness. For 
instance, a variety of studies find increasing returns to electric distribution up to 
at least 20,000 customers (Salvanes and Tjøtta 1994; Yatchew 2000; Growitsch, 
Jamasb, and Pollitt 2009). Many municipal utilities cannot take advantage of 
these economies of scale because a variety of institutional factors lead them to be 
too small.4 In my expenditure sample, 9 percent of municipal utilities have more 
1 The other goals for advocates of municipalization are lowering electricity rates and using more 
renewable energy.
2 In addition, when northern New York was ravaged by an ice storm in 1998, customers of the 
municipally owned Massena Electric restored power after 2 days, while customers of neighboring 
communities served by investor-owned National Grid were in the dark for 3 weeks (Bruun 2009). 
Customers of Butler Power and Light, a municipally owned utility in New Jersey, had better electric-
ity service after Superstorm Sandy in 2012 than customers of neighboring towns that were served by 
the investor-owned Jersey Central Power and Light (Janoski 2012). In 2003, residents of White Park, 
Florida, municipalized their electrical service in response to frequent power outages (Sigo 2003). 
The city of South Daytona, Florida, attempted to municipalize electrical service to ensure more fre-
quent tree trimming around lines and quicker responses by repair crews after major storms. How-
ever, in 2013, voters rejected the measure (Weiss 2013).
3 Similarly, NStar had 3.08 line technicians per 10,000 residents, while Massachusetts’s municipal 
utilities averaged 3.8 per 10,000 residents (Van Voorhis 2012).
4 An example of an institutional factor that ensures that municipal utilities remain small is the 
federal law that prohibits the use of tax-exempt municipal bonds to finance the purchase of electric- 
power-generating facilities from private utilities (Jones 1989). Another example is Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission Order 888 (18 C.F.R. pts. 35 and 385 [1996]). Under this order, investor- 
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than 20,000 residential customers, versus 82 percent of investor- owned utilities.5 
Further, I find that municipal utilities have a smaller fraction of their distribution 
networks underground. Thus, I cannot conclude that municipal utilities are bet-
ter prepared for storms by solely examining maintenance expenditures.
Second, I examine the effect of ownership type on storm-related outages, 
where I proxy for outages using the percentage difference between one month’s 
electricity consumption and electricity consumption in the same month of the 
prior year. For my proxy for outages, I have a stratified random sample of 241 in-
vestor-owned, 96 cooperative, and 94 municipal utilities in the United States be-
tween 1999 and 2012. I find that storms with damages (destruction of private and 
public property) that equal 1 percent of personal income lead to a 1.85 percent 
decrease in residential electricity consumption by municipal utilities but have no 
effect on consumption by investor-owned utilities.
These results suggest that privatizing municipal utilities would result in savings 
in federal subsidies and maintenance expenditures while preserving the quality 
of service following storms. These conclusions are consistent with prior interna-
tional experiences. There were fewer outages following the privatization of elec-
tric distribution in Argentina (Gonzalez-Eiras and Rossi 2007) and in the state 
of Victoria in Australia (Hartley 1999), while the privatization of electric distri-
bution in Italy did not lead to an increase in power outages (Fumagalli, Garrone, 
and Grilli 2007). However, I am not aware of any work that examines the effect of 
ownership type on storm preparedness in the United States.6
Section 2 provides an empirical framework and discusses potential threats to 
identification. Section 3 describes the data and provides summary statistics by 
ownership type. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes.
2. Empirical Framework
I estimate two regressions. The first examines the effect of a utility’s ownership 
type on spending on its distribution network, and the second examines the effect 
of a utility’s ownership type on storm-related changes in power usage.
owned utilities must be compensated for stranded costs, the losses in revenues to the utility that 
result from municipalization (Doane and Spulber 1997).
5 There are many other reasons to expect municipal utilities to operate inefficiently. For instance, 
I expect managers of municipal utilities to have lower personal incentives to minimize costs (Hart, 
Shleifer, and Vishny 1997) and to have to respond to short-term electoral pressures (Levitt 1997; 
Vlaicu and Whalley 2013).
6 Studies of the United States have found that, compared with municipal electric utilities, investor- 
owned utilities charge higher prices (Peltzman 1971; Kwoka 2002) but adopt new technologies ear-
lier (Rose and Joskow 1990). There is also work examining the effect of regulation of investor- owned 
utilities on outages. Hausman (2014) finds that deregulation leads to fewer unplanned power out-
ages at nuclear power plants. Ter-Martirosyan and Kwoka (2010) find that regulatory provisions 
that provide incentives for low costs increase the length of power outages, while those that provide 
incentives for quality reduce the length of power outages. Lim and Yurukoglu (2014) find that there 
are fewer outages in states where a higher proportion of public utility commissioners are Republi-
can.
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2.1. Effect of Ownership on Spending on the Distribution Network
In the first regression, the unit of observation is a utility u. The effect of a util-
ity’s ownership type on spending on its distribution network is measured in the 
following cross-sectional regressions:
 ln ( ) ( )eu e s ue o ue e u= + + +a a a b1 2 3 X  
and
 pu p s up o up p u= + + +a a a b1 2 3( ) ( ) X ,  
where eu is utility u’s distribution operations and maintenance expenditures per 
distribution line mile and pu is the percentage of distribution lines underground. 
The variable o(u) denotes the mode of ownership of utility u: investor owned, 
municipal, or cooperative. The variable s(u) is the state where the utility has most 
of its residential customers. Finally, Xu is a vector of controls.
2.2. Effect of Ownership on Storm-Related Changes in Power Usage
In the second regression, the unit of observation is a utility u operating in state 
s, year y, and month t. To estimate the effect of ownership type on storm-related 
changes in power usage, I estimate the following panel regression:
 ( ) ln ln( ) ( )1 1 2 3D = + + + D + D-
=
åqusyt y s o u o um usyt m
m h
k
sa a a b gDamages dusyt .  (1)
The dependent variable qusyt is residential electricity consumption, and ∆ denotes 
the difference between the current month’s value of q and the prior year’s value of 
q; that is, ∆ ln qusyt = ln qusyt – ln qusyt–1t . There are two reasons for estimating the 
regression in long differences. First, the dependent variables are potentially sea-
sonal. Thus, by eliminating seasonality, I reduce the errors in the dependent vari-
ables. Second, in many states, large storms tend to occur during months when 
electricity consumption is the highest. Thus, seasonal effects are potential sources 
of endogeneity.
In the more general version of the regression, I allow damages to have contem-
poraneous (m = 0), lagged (m > 0), and lead effects (m < 0). The main explan-
atory variable, Damagesusyt–m , is the sum of storm damages (destruction of private 
and public property) during year y, month t - m, over all the counties served by 
utility u in state s. Damages are measured as a percentage of yearly personal in-
come over the same counties. Thus, Damages equals one if damages are 1 percent 
of personal income. The primary coefficient of interest, bo u
m
( ) ,  is the interaction 
of mode of ownership and storm damages that occurred m months prior. For 
instance, if b1 2Public =- ,  then damages equaling 1 percent of personal income 
lead to a 2 percent reduction in residential electricity consumption by municipal 
utilities 1 month after the storm.
The scalars ay1 ,  as
2 ,  and ao u( )
3  denote year, state, and mode of ownership fixed 
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effects. The variable dusyt denotes the sum of heating degree days and cooling de-
gree days, two variables commonly used to predict electricity consumption. I al-
low the impact of degree days on the dependent variable γs to vary by state.
I provide an illustration of my findings by estimating equation (1) with current 
damages, one lead, and one lag, that is, with h = -1 and k = 1. To simplify 
the tables, I estimate the effect of the sum of the current and prior month’s storm 
damages. In other words, I set h = 0, k = 1, and b b bo u o u o u( ) ( ) ( )= =0 1  and estimate
 ( ) ln ln( ) ( )2 1 2 3
0
1
D = + + + + D + D-
=
åqusyt y s o u o u usyt m
m
sa a a b gDamages dusyt .  (2)
2.3. Potential Threats to Identification
For the regressions with expenditures, one may be concerned that municipal 
utilities are more likely to face storms that are potentially damaging to electri-
cal service. This positive correlation would arise if municipal utilities cover ar-
eas that cannot be served profitably by investor-owned utilities because of fre-
quent storm damages to utilities. Thus, one could hypothesize that municipal 
utilities have to spend more on maintenance of their distribution networks be-
cause they have to be more prepared for future storms or for an incoming storm. 
Institutional factors make it unlikely that ownership type is strongly correlated 
with current storm damages, because ownership type is difficult to change, and 
ownership type of many utilities dates back to the 1940s.7 While storm damages 
may have influenced ownership type in the 1940s, I expect technological and 
population changes to have altered the susceptibility of electrical systems to suf-
fer storm-related outages.8 Thus, it is conceivable that current ownership type is 
more strongly correlated with county characteristics that made storms damaging 
70 years ago than with current characteristics. Nonetheless, I check the robust-
ness of the results by including variables for damages to private and public prop-
erty in two time periods: 1994–2002 and 2003–12. 
It is also possible that municipal utilities are concentrated in states with differ-
ent weather patterns or labor costs for historical reasons. Figure 1 presents the 
counties in the contiguous United States served by the utilities in the expendi-
ture sample.  Municipal utilities are overrepresented in Nebraska, Tennessee, and 
7 Among the 182 electric utility acquisitions recorded in Platts (2006) for 1985–2007, only four 
involved a municipality acquiring an investor-owned utility, and none involved an investor-owned 
utility acquiring a municipal utility. An example of an institutional factor that makes changes in 
ownership type difficult is a Connecticut law that sets the following requirements for creating a mu-
nicipal utility: a two-thirds vote of the municipality’s legislative body, approval of its chief executive, 
and approval of the voters at a referendum (McCarthy and Hansen 2012). Another institutional fac-
tor is public employees’ labor unions’ opposition to privatization of municipal utilities, presumably 
for fear of loss of employment and pensions (Beecher, Dreese, and Stanford 1995; Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny 1997).
8 Further, politics was a big factor in determining their original ownership type. For instance, 
many municipal utilities were established around the turn of the 19th century as a means of com-
bating corruption in cities (Schap 1986; Glaeser 2004), while electric cooperatives are the product of 
the New Deal.
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Washington State. I account for this geographic concentration by including state 
fixed effects in the regressions.
For the regression examining power usage, there are four possible threats to 
identification. The first is the concern that municipal utilities are less likely to face 
damaging storms. If this is the case, I may expect municipal utilities to be less 
prepared for storms and hence to experience greater disruptions when faced with 
a major storm. I attempt to mitigate this problem by excluding from the sample 
utilities located in areas that have suffered high levels of storm-related damages. 
I also reestimate the regression excluding the observations of one state, one state 
at a time.
A second potential threat to identification arises from the concern that my 
measure of damages does not capture damages to electric utilities. The reason for 
this is that my measure of damages includes destruction to all personal and pub-
lic property, and destruction of property belonging to electric utilities is likely to 
be a small fraction of the total. Further, a variety of factors influence the size of 
this fraction. In rural areas, electrical circuits are long and more exposed to a va-
riety of factors that can lead to outages (Kaufmann et al. 2010). Alternatively, the 
same wind speeds may result in different levels of monetary damages to private 
and public property, depending on whether the county is urban, rural, poor, or 
rich. I try to account for these possibilities by controlling for factors such as the 
nature of the storm, population density, income, and the value of houses.
A third potential threat to identification relates to the concern that the reduc-
tion in electricity consumption after a storm results from a change in demand 
rather than a change in supply.9 For instance, if areas served by municipal utili-
ties are more likely to have mass evacuations in anticipation of storms, then the 
reduction in the demand for electricity is greater for municipal than for inves-
tor-owned utilities. I address this concern in two ways. First, differences in de-
mand may be due to differences in observable characteristics. Thus, these demand 
effects are controlled for by including additional variables in the regression: dam-
ages caused by tropical storms and the interaction of damages with income per 
capita, population density, and the value of houses. Second, I reestimate equa-
tion (2) with retail sales and employment as the dependent variables. If changes 
in electricity demand caused by a storm differ by utility ownership type, then I 
would also expect changes in employment and retail sales caused by a storm to 
differ by ownership type. Conversely, if I find small ownership-type differences in 
the impact of storms on employment and retail sales, it is unlikely that my find-
ings result from ownership-type differences in changes in the demand for elec-
tricity.
A fourth potential threat to identification arises from the concern that changes 
9 I expect changes in the demand for electricity because prior studies show that hurricanes have 
short-term effects on the local economy. Belasen and Polachek (2009) find that Florida counties hit 
by hurricanes experience short-term increases in wages and decreases in employment, while Strobl 
(2011) finds that in response to hurricanes, coastal counties experience short-term decreases in per-
sonal income.
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in power usage are a poor proxy for outages. In Section 3.2, I provide statistical 
evidence that power outages are correlated with changes in monthly consump-
tion. More importantly, measurement error in a dependent variable is a source 
of bias only if it is related to the explanatory variable. For instance, I might ex-
pect industrial power plants to have to compensate for any losses in production 
during an outage. If this is the case, and if investor-owned utilities sell a greater 
fraction of their power to industrial power plants, then measurement error is cor-
related with ownership type, and the estimates will be biased. I attempt to control 
for this by separating residential from nonresidential electricity consumption.
3. Data, Samples, and Summary Statistics
3.1. Expenditure Data
I examine operations and maintenance expenditures on distribution networks, 
which comprise the wiring of electricity from electrical substations to customers 
(generally in lines below 35 kV).10 For investor-owned utilities and a few coop-
eratives, data on distribution expenditures are from Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission Form 1, Electric Utility Annual Report.11 Operations expenditures 
include the cost of changing line transformer taps, performing load tests of line 
transformers, and adjusting line-testing equipment. Maintenance expenditures 
include the costs of straightening poles, trimming trees, and clearing brush (see 
Uniform System of Accounts Prescribed for Public Utilities and Licensees Sub-
ject to the Provisions of the Federal Power Act, 18 C.F.R. pt. 101). For munici-
pal utilities, expenditure data are from the Energy Information Administration’s 
Form EIA-412, Annual Electric Industry Financial Report.12 Giles and Hayes 
(1999) provide the length of the distribution system (overhead and underground) 
and additional data on distribution expenditures.
3.2. Power Usage Data
There are three potential sources for outage data. The Department of Ener-
gy’s Form OE-417, Electric Emergency Incident and Disturbance Report, should 
collect instances of all significant power outages, and data from the reports thus 
would seem to provide an ideal proxy for storm-related outages.13 However, util-
ities are required to report only losses of electrical service that affect more than 
50,000 customers. Since investor-owned utilities are much larger than municipal 
utilities, they are much more likely to have to report a power outage. For instance, 
in 2011, only 2 percent of municipal utilities had more than 50,000 customers, 
10 In contrast, transmission networks comprise the wiring of electricity from power plants or grids 
to electrical substations (generally in lines above 69 kV).
11 See Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Form 1—Electric Utility Annual Report: Data 
(Current and Historical) (https://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/forms/form-1/data.asp).
12 See Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-412 Archive Data (https://www.eia.gov 
/electricity/data/eia412/).
13 See Department of Energy, Electric Disturbance Events (OE-417) Annual Summaries (https://
www.oe.netl.doe.gov/OE417_annual_summary.aspx).
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versus 54 percent of investor-owned utilities. Thus, these data are a biased mea-
sure of which mode of ownership is more likely to experience power outages.
I can, however, use the Form OE-417 data to provide evidence of the impor-
tance of storm-related outages. I examine the 2003–12 Form OE-417 events, ex-
cluding outages that affected fewer than 500 customers and for which I could 
not identify the affected utilities. I group the source of outage into hurricane, 
winter weather, other weather, or not weather related (breaker failures, fires, 
earthquakes, electrical system separation, generation inadequacy, load shedding, 
transmission equipment failure, and vandalism). For each type of outage, I use 
the average values for the number of customers affected and the duration. I com-
pute the percentage of customers affected as (number of customers affected)/ 
(total number of residential customers), where the number of residential custom-
ers served by a utility is from Form EIA-861 data (discussed below). The sum-
mary statistics reported in Table 1 show that 37 percent of outages are weather 
related, which tend to affect more customers and be of longer duration.
Other sources of outage data are state utility commissions. These data were used 
to study the reliability of investor-owned utilities’ service by Ter- Martirosyan 
and Kwoka (2010) and Lim and Yurukoglu (2014). However, state utility com-
missions do not usually collect outage data for municipal utilities and coopera-
tives, and thus I cannot use them to examine the impact of mode of ownership 
on outages.
Instead, I proxy outages by changes in monthly electricity consumption for 
a stratified sample of utilities surveyed by the Energy Information Administra-
tion.14 This survey, the Monthly Electric Utility Sales and Revenue Report with 
State Distributions (compiled from Form EIA-826), provides residential con-
sumption (in megawatts), nonresidential consumption (in megawatts), and the 
number of residential customers. I also include 204 additional observations from 
the Florida Public Service Commission’s Statistics of the Florida Electric Utility 
Industry (1999–2011).
My proxy for outages is the percentage difference between a month’s residen-
tial electricity consumption and residential electricity consumption the same 
month of the prior year.15 As mentioned in the Introduction, customers of NStar 
suffered power outages after Hurricane Irene hit Massachusetts on August 27, 
2011. My data report that NStar sold 527,532 MW to residential customers in 
August 2011, compared with 557,290 in August 2010 and 548,929 in August 
2012. Thus, the power outage was associated with a (557,290 - 527,532)/557,290 
= 5 percent decrease in electricity consumption.
There are two advantages to this proxy for power outages. First, the proper 
functioning of the electric grid requires balancing flows of electricity generated 
14 The random-sampling procedure ensures coverage of all states and the District of Columbia 
and oversamples larger utilities.
15 More precisely, the proxy is the difference between the log of a month’s residential electricity 
consumption and the log of the previous year’s electricity consumption.
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and sold.16 Thus, I expect reported electricity consumption to be highly accu-
rate.17 Second, electricity consumption is available for all modes of ownership.
The Form OE-417 data provide some support for my proxy for outages, since 
reports of outages are correlated with changes in electricity consumption. In the 
46 observations in which utilities reported weather-related outages that affected 
at least 10 percent of monthly residential customer hours, monthly residential 
electricity consumption decreased by 1.62 percent. In the 789 months when a 
utility had outages that affected less than 10 percent of monthly residential cus-
tomer hours, residential electricity consumption increased by .56 percent.18 In the 
46,822 months when a utility did not report any outages, residential electricity 
consumption increased by 1.82 percent.
As discussed in Section 2, it is important that the analysis be in long differences 
to account for seasonality of residential electricity consumption and the fact that 
seasonality varies by state. This is shown in Figure 2, which presents average 
monthly residential consumption for Florida and North Dakota for 1990–2012. 
In Florida, electricity consumption peaks during the summer when air condi-
tioning is used most intensively, while in North Dakota, electricity consumption 
peaks in the winter when heating is used most intensively.
16 One way to see this is to look at Electric Information Agency (2013), where table 1.3 provides 
total energy generated, lost, and exported from a survey of power plant operators (EIA-923), and 
table 2.2 provides total consumption from a survey of the power industry (EIA-861). By comparing 
the two tables, I can verify that consumption = generation - losses - exports.
17 As discussed in Section 5.2, there is still error in my proxy because, for confidentiality reasons, 
the Electric Information Agency does not release information about electricity purchased from 
power marketers by utility and month.
18 There are two reasons why the number of observations with outages reported in this section is 
different than in Table 1. First, outages included in Table 1 can affect multiple utilities. In this case, 
to relate outages to changes in monthly electricity consumption, I allocate outages to each utility in 
proportion to the number of residential customers. Second, in this section I include only outages for 
which I had data on monthly electricity consumption.
Table 1
Summary Statistics for Outages, 2003–12
Outage Type Events
Customers 
Affected (%)
Duration 
(Hours)
Hurricane 210 40 106
Winter weather 203 21 86
Other weather 222 22 83
Nonweather 1,095 24 67
Data sources. Department of Energy, Electric Disturbance Events (OE-417) An-
nual Summaries (https://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/OE417_annual_summary.aspx); 
Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Sales, Revenue, and Energy 
Efficiency Form EIA-861 Detailed Data Files (https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data 
/eia861/).
Note. Events that affected fewer than 500 customers and events for which the af-
fected utilities could not be identified are excluded.
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3.3. Data on Storm Events
Information on storm events is from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration National Climatic Data Center’s Storm Event Database (National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 2014). I examine storms from 1996 
onward since for prior years the database includes only tornado, thunderstorm 
wind, and hail events.19
Damages refer to the destruction of private property (structures, objects, and 
vegetation), public infrastructure, and public facilities. National weather officers 
obtain this information from insurance companies, emergency managers, the 
Geological Survey, the Army Corps of Engineers, power utility companies, news-
paper articles, and other sources (National Weather Service 2007). The Storm 
Event Database includes 393,862 hurricanes, tornadoes, thunderstorms, floods, 
lightning, and winter weather events. Table 2 lists summary statistics for these 
events. The two types of events with the highest per capita damages are tornadoes 
with F-scale ratings20 higher than 2 and hurricanes (property damages of $315 
and $590 per capita, respectively).
One potential problem with the storm data is the arbitrariness in labeling 
events. For instance, Downton, Miller, and Pielke (2005) point out that the Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration does not report the $520 mil-
lion in flood damages in Massachusetts for February 1978 (the $520 million fig-
ure is from an Army Corps of Engineers’ report). In fact, the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration does report this event but lists it as a blizzard 
(with damages of $50–$500 million; see National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
19 Another potential source of data is the Spatial Hazards Events and Losses Database for the 
United States (SHELDUS). The authors of this database collected storm damages prior to 1996 from 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (1978), which uses storm damage catego-
ries; for instance, one category represents damages of $500 million–$5 billion. Thus, property dam-
ages before 1996 are not easily comparable to property damages in later years.
20 Tornado strength is measured according to the Fujita tornado damage scale.
Figure 2. Average residential consumption, 1990–2012
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ministration 1978). In the main specifications, I resolve the arbitrariness of the 
labeling of storm events by aggregating damages across all types of storm.
Again, I can use the Form OE-417 data to provide some support for my proxy 
for damages. In the 59 observations in which utilities reported weather-related 
outages that affected at least 10 percent of monthly residential customer hours, 
the area covered by the utility suffered monthly damages equal to .77 percent 
of personal income. In the 1,035 observations in which a utility reported out-
ages that affected less than 10 percent of monthly residential customer hours, the 
area suffered monthly damages equal to .37 percent of personal income.21 In the 
376,138 observations in which a utility did not report any outages, the area suf-
fered monthly damages equal to .02 percent.
3.4. Other Data
I obtain mode of ownership, the percentage of electricity that is self-generated, 
and the list of counties covered by each utility from a yearly survey conducted by 
the Energy Information Administration (compiled from Form EIA-861, Annual 
Electric Power Industry Report).22 Yearly personal income and midyear popula-
tion estimates for each county are from the Department of Commerce’s Bureau 
of Economic Analysis. I lag these numbers by 1 year; thus, for 2012, I use the pop-
ulation for 2011. The average value of a detached house is from the 2000 census.
Heating degree days and cooling degree days measure how far temperatures 
are from 65 degrees Fahrenheit; these data are from the National Climatic Data 
21 The number of observations with outages reported in this section is larger than in Table 1 be-
cause some outages included in Table 1 affected multiple utilities.
22 Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Sales, Revenue, and Energy Efficiency 
Form EIA-861 Detailed Data Files (https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/).
Table 2
Summary Statistics for Storm Events
Population Damages ($Millions)
Event Type Events per Event Total Per Capita 
Tropical cyclone 5,443 175,247 163,877 171.80
 Hurricane 1,191 133,105 93,434 589.39
Tornado 21,156 113,061 26,621 11.13
 F-scale > 2 780 77,303 18,967 314.56
Winter weather 91,867 92,417 9,152 1.08
Flood 30,927 167,869 170,336 32.81
Thunderstorm 261,609 156,478 18,396 .45
 Wind > 80 mph 9,960 178,996 8,143 4.57
Lightning 11,488 327,706 796 .21
Data source. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2014).
Note. Tornado strength is measured according to the Fujita tornado damage 
scale.
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Center for each weather station and month.23 I use the ZIP code of each weather 
station to aggregate the data at the county level, using as weights the ratio of all 
county addresses that are located in a particular ZIP code.24 Moreover, the county 
weather data are aggregated at the utility level, using county population numbers 
as weights. Finally, heating and cooling degree days are computed by summing 
heating degree days and cooling degree days.
Sources for data on retail sales are listed in the Appendix; for most states, I use 
taxable sales as a proxy for retail sales. Employment statistics are from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics.25 Information about which electric utilities were supervised by 
the state regulatory agency in 1990 is from Rodgers and Bauer (1991).
3.5. Aggregation of County-Level Data
All county-level variables are aggregated at the level of the utility using the 
information for the counties served by each utility. However, the aggregation 
is done differently in the expenditure and the power usage samples (that is, the 
monthly electrical consumption).
For the expenditure sample, since the data are a cross section, I use the infor-
mation for the counties that are served by a utility in 2000. For example, to com-
pute the population in the area served by a utility, I add the populations of all 
the counties it served in 2000. When computing damages for 1994–2002, I add 
the damages for all hurricanes, tornadoes, thunderstorms, lightning, and winter 
weather events (ice storm, wintry mix, and so forth) for 1994–2002 in the coun-
ties served by the utility in 2000. Since I want to measure whether a utility serves 
an area that is prone to storm damages, I examine past storm damages in the 
area, regardless of whether that utility covered it in the past.
For the outage sample, since the data set is a panel, I use the information for 
the counties that are served by a utility for each year. For example, to compute 
damages in December 2006, I add damages for all storm events in that month in 
counties served by the utility in 2006. Since the regression is in first differences, 
my measure of damages for December 2006 is the difference between damages in 
December 2006 and in December 2005. Thus, to ensure comparability in dam-
ages, I eliminate from the sample observations in years when a utility changed the 
area it covered.
23 The minimum and maximum temperatures are collected for each weather station and day (see 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Climate Data Online [http://www.ncdc.noaa 
.gov/cdo-web/search]). Then, heating degrees for a particular day = max{0, 65 - (min + max)/2}, 
and cooling degrees for a particular day = max{0, (min + max)/2 - 65}. Heating degree and cool-
ing degree days for each station and month are computed by averaging heating degrees and cooling 
degrees for all the days of the month.
24 See US Department of Housing and Urban Development, HUD USPS ZIP Code Crosswalk 
Files (http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/usps_crosswalk.html).
25 See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics (ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/time 
.series/la/).
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3.6. Samples
The expenditure sample consists of 179 investor-owned utilities, 801 coopera-
tives, and 1,437 municipal utilities for which I could obtain the length of distri-
bution lines. Expenditure data are quite noisy, and I was not able to obtain them 
for all years. To minimize the error, I average real distribution expenditures over 
1995–2002. Nonetheless, the number of utilities for which I have distribution ex-
penditures is substantially smaller and consists of 149 investor-owned utilities, 
447 cooperatives, and 600 municipal utilities.26
Starting in 1999, the Form EIA-861 data include the list of counties covered 
by each utility. For this reason, I restrict the power usage sample to 1999–2012. 
I exclude the only federal utility from the data set (the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ 
Mission Power) and combine utilities owned by municipalities, states, and polit-
ical subdivisions. Further, I exclude utilities that cover areas that had unusually 
high levels of storm damages during 1996–98,  although my main findings hold if 
I do not exclude them.
Thus, my sample consists of 241 investor-owned utilities, 96 cooperatives, and 
94 municipal utilities.27 If a utility changes ownership type over the sample, it 
is considered a different utility.28 In the power usage sample, I define utilities 
as firms operating in a single state. Thus, a utility that operates in three states is 
counted as three utilities.29 The unit of observation is a utility-year-month. Since 
the sample is from 1999 to 2012, each utility has at most 14 × 12 = 168 observa-
tions. The sample size is, however, reduced because I have a stratified sample, and 
thus not all utilities are observed in all years. I end up with 31,659 observations 
from investor-owned utilities, 13,282 from cooperatives, and 13,474 from munic-
ipal utilities.
In the regressions, my sample is further reduced to account for a variety of 
sources of measurement error. I lose the first year of observations for each utility, 
since I estimate the regressions in long differences to account for seasonal effects. 
Another source of measurement error is changes in the counties served by a util-
ity. I eliminate this measurement error by excluding the years when a utility just 
changed county coverage.
26 Thus, the cross-sectional expenditure sample is really two samples: a sample for which there 
are data on the length of the distribution lines and a subsample for which there are data on expen-
ditures. Fortunately, the ownership-type shares are roughly similar for the full sample and the sub-
sample: for the full sample, the muncipally owned and investor-owned shares are 59 percent and 7.4 
percent, respectively, while for the subsample, the municipally owned and investor-owned shares 
are 50 percent and 12.5 percent.
27 I end up with a higher percentage of investor-owned utilities in the power usage sample because 
the stratified sample oversamples larger utilities.
28 Three utilities for which I have monthly data changed ownership type over the sample: Kaui 
Island Utility Cooperative purchased the Hawaii division of Citizen Communications Company, 
Vermont Electric Cooperative purchased the Vermont division of Citizen Communications Com-
pany, and A&N Electric Cooperative purchased the distribution portion of the Delmarva Power 
Company.
29 A total of 5.6 percent of municipal utilities, 21.4 percent of investor-owned utilities, and 26.8 
percent of cooperative utilities operate in more than one state.
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Consumption of electricity purchased from power marketers leads to an addi-
tional source of measurement error. For confidentiality reasons, monthly elec-
tricity consumption statistics released to the public do not include electricity pur-
chased from power marketers or the number of customers served with electricity 
purchased from power marketers. Thus, an increase in the use of electricity from 
power marketers leads to a decrease in reported monthly electricity consump-
tion. I reduce this measurement error in two ways. First, because an increase in 
consumption of electricity purchased from power marketers decreases both res-
idential electricity sales and the number of residential customers, I reduce the 
measurement error by examining residential electricity consumption per cus-
tomer. Second, the Form EIA-861 data provide yearly electricity consumption 
purchased from power marketers, so I reduce the error in reported monthly elec-
tricity sales by excluding all utilities-states-years in which the percentage of cus-
tomers that receive electricity purchased from power marketers changed by more 
than 10 percent compared with the previous year.
3.7. Summary Statistics
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the expenditure sample by ownership 
type. Investor-owned utilities are by far the largest utility type, and municipal 
utilities are the smallest. A few studies estimate returns to scale in distribution 
of electricity. Using electric distribution data for Norway and Canada, Salvanes 
and Tjøtta (1994) and Yatchew (2000) find economies of scale for up to 20,000 
customers, while using electric distribution data for seven European countries, 
Growitsch, Jamasb, and Pollitt (2009) find economies of scale throughout the 
sample. In the full sample, 82 percent of investor-owned utilities have more than 
20,000 residential customers, while only 9 percent of municipal utilities have 
more than 20,000 residential customers. Thus, the referenced literature suggests 
that investor-owned utilities operate at a more efficient scale than municipal util-
ities.
Storm damages are normalized by dividing real damages (destruction of pri-
vate and public property) by real personal income in 2000 in the counties covered 
by the utility. The average normalized damages for 1996–2002 were highest for 
cooperatives and lowest for investor-owned utilities, while in 2003–12 they were 
highest for investor-owned utilities and lowest for municipal utilities. Thus, there 
appears to be quite a bit of variability in which ownership types suffer the most 
storm damages. Within ownership types, there is also large variation in which 
utilities suffer the most damages; for example, the standard deviation of yearly 
damages for municipal utilities in 1996–2002 is more than 6 times larger than its 
mean. The sub sample is similar to the full sample. Nonetheless, municipal utili-
ties in the subsample tend to be larger, have more underground lines, be located 
in larger cities, and have lower levels of damages in 1996–2002 compared with 
municipal utilities in the full sample. More importantly, Table 3 indicates that 
municipal utilities spend the most on operations and maintenance of their dis-
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Table 3
Summary Statistics for the Expenditure Sample, 1995–2002
Municipal
Investor  
Owned Cooperative
Full sample:
 N 1,437 179 801
 Distribution miles 312 16,240 2,495
(937) (22,754) (1,739)
 % Lines underground 13 20 10
(19) (18) (12)
 >20,000 Customers (%) 9 82 27
(29) (38) (44)
 People per square mile by county 209 355 82
(465) (993) (112)
 Customers per mile 62 38 9
(69) (25) (49)
 Residential (%) 83 86 87
(7) (4) (11)
 Wages for trade, transportation, and utilities ($) 40,679 47,668 40,875
(10,422) (10,526) (8,476)
 Yearly damages, 1994–2002 (%) .165 .082 .234
(1.030) (.241) (1.132)
 Yearly damages, 2003–12 (%) .165 .302 .221
(.567) (1.463) (.938)
Sample with distribution expenditures:
 N 600 149 447
 Distribution expenditures per mile ($) 12,743 4,031 6,011
(20,299) (3,350) (96,615)
 Distribution miles 602 18,412 2,615
(1,328) (23,494) (1,794)
 % Lines underground 18 21 11
(20) (19) (13)
 >20,000 Customers (%) 22 91 27
(41) (28) (44)
 People per square mile by county 298 395 81
(588) (1,073) (102)
 Customers per mile 59 37 10
(58) (25) (65)
 Residential (%) 83 87 87
(8) (3) (11)
 Wages for trade, transportation, and utilities ($) 42,982 48,456 40,973
(12,375) (9,074) (8,169)
 Yearly damages, 1994–2002 (%) .105 .082 .239
(.579) (.247) (1.148)
 Yearly damages, 2003–12 (%) .156 .340 .207
Data sources. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Form 1—Electric Utility Annual Report: 
Data (Current and Historical) (https://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/forms/form-1/data.asp); Energy 
Information Administration, Form EIA-412 Archive Data (https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data 
/eia412/); Giles and Hayes (1999). Yearly damages for 1994–2012 are from National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration (2014).
Note. Data are means, with standard deviations in parentheses. The utility-mean value of each vari-
able is computed for 1995–2002 to form a single cross section. 
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tribution network, while investor-owned utilities have the highest percentage of 
distribution lines underground. 
Table 4 provides summary statistics for the power usage sample. Investor- 
owned utilities tend to be the largest, while cooperatives tend to be the small-
est, regardless of whether I measure the size of a utility by residential electricity 
consumption, nonresidential electricity consumption, the number of residen-
tial customers, or the total population in the counties served by the utility. For 
instance, the average investor-owned utility has 410,502 residential customers, 
while the average cooperative has 35,777 residential customers. Further, investor- 
owned utilities self-generate a much higher percentage of the electricity they sell, 
compared with municipal utilities (43 percent versus 25 percent). Table 4 also 
shows that cooperatives cover areas with much lower density than municipal and 
investor- owned utilities, namely, 94 inhabitants per square mile versus 407 and 
380, respectively.
Nonetheless, municipal, investor-owned, and cooperative utilities cover sim-
ilar areas in terms of income per capita and residential electricity consumption 
per customer. Income per capita is $35,306–$36,868, while the average resi-
dential customer purchases 42 kW of electricity per day. The average value of 
a detached house is similar in areas covered by municipal and investor-owned 
utilities ($136,082 versus $129,573) but lower in areas covered by cooperatives 
($115,846). Despite the similar incomes, retail sales vary by mode of ownership; 
retail sales are $28 per capita and day in areas served by an investor-owned utility 
versus $36 in areas served by a cooperative. These differences may be due to the 
proxy for retail sales, which for most states is taxable sales. Thus, ownership-type 
differences in taxable sales may be due to differences among states in which goods 
are taxed. Further, municipal, investor-owned, and cooperative utilities cover 
areas with different weather patterns. Cooperative and investor-owned utilities 
experience more extreme weather (18 degree days versus 16 for municipal util-
ities). I construct the sample of utilities in a way that ensures that they had sim-
ilar storm damages in 1996–98. However, over the sample period (1999–2012), 
investor-owned utilities covered areas with the highest level of storm damages, 
while municipal utilities covered areas with the lowest level of damages.
4. Results
4.1. Expenditure Sample
Table 5 presents the results of regressions of the logarithm of operations and 
maintenance distribution expenses (per mile of distribution line) on indicator 
variables for ownership type, with cooperative ownership as the excluded cate-
gory. Municipal utilities spend 1.961 - 1.055 ≈ 91 percent more per mile than 
investor-owned utilities. Some of the differences in cost may be due to the fact 
that municipal utilities serve more densely populated areas, where maintaining 
the distribution network is inherently more expensive. For this reason, I reesti-
mate the regression with additional controls for the log of the number of custom-
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ers per line mile, the log of the percentage of electric customers that are residen-
tial, the log of the population density, and the log of county wages in the sector 
of trade, transportation, and utilities. As expected, distribution expenditures are 
higher for utilities with more customers per distribution line mile. Nonetheless, 
even with these controls, I find that municipal utilities spend .035 - (−.438) ≈ 
47 percent more per mile than investor-owned utilities.
A more direct way of controlling for utility size is to restrict the sample to 
 investor-owned, municipal, and cooperative utilities that are roughly the same 
size. In Table 6, I regress the logarithm of operations and maintenance distribu-
tion expenses for utilities on the basis of size. The table includes p-values for the 
Table 4
Summary Statistics for the Power Usage Sample, 1999–2012
Municipal
Investor
Owned Cooperative
Residential sales (Mw/day) 3,625 11,371 1,348
(6,410) (18,711) (1,559)
Self-generated (%) 25 43 5
(34) (35) (19)
Nonresidential sales (Mw/day) 5,787 18,710 1,449
(8,986) (28,411) (2,737)
Residential customers 116,249 410,502 35,777
(217,455) (692,510) (35,891)
Population of county 817,039 1,908,066 452,815
(1,591,849) (2,943,544) (571,213)
People per square mile by county 407 380 94
(611) (1,229) (144)
Income per capita by county 36,329 36,868 35,306
(7,351) (7,802) (7,438)
Average house value by county 136,082 129,573 115,846
(57,595) (64,209) (43,034)
Residential sales (kW per capita/
customer/day) 42 42 42
(29) (31) (26)
Retail sales (per capita/day) ($) 33 28 36
(13) (11) (14)
Monthly damages (% of personal 
income) .004 .017 .012
(.131) (.985) (.341)
Monthly damages, 1996–98 (% of 
personal income) .003 .004 .003
(.004) (.006) (.004)
Heating and cooling degree days 16 18 18
(11) (12) (13)
Data sources. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Form 1—Electric Utility Annual Report: Data 
(Current and Historical) (https://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/forms/form-1/data.asp); Energy Infor-
mation Administration, Form EIA-412 Archive Data (https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia412/); 
Giles and Hayes (1999).
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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test that investor-owned utilities spend the same as municipal utilities. For the 
three samples, I can reject this hypothesis with p-values of <.001, .074, and .011.
The higher distribution expenses may be due to the fact that municipal utilities 
faced more storms in the sample period. In 1994–2002, areas covered by mu-
nicipal utilities in the expenditure sample had 28 percent higher levels of storm 
damages than areas covered by investor-owned utilities (see Table 3). However, 
in a utility’s income statement, storm damages are classified as extraordinary ex-
penses and thus are not included in the measure of operations and maintenance 
expenses. Nonetheless, it is possible that municipal utilities spend more on dis-
tribution maintenance because they are in areas that have greater storm activity. 
There are two reasons why this explanation is not sufficient to explain the higher 
maintenance expenditures by municipal utilities. First, in 2003–12, damage levels 
in areas covered by investor-owned utilities were 118 percent higher than in ar-
eas covered by municipal utilities (see Table 3). Thus, while it is clear that storm 
damages are highly volatile, municipal utilities in the expenditure sample do not 
appear to be located in areas with greater propensities to suffer storm damages. 
Second, I reestimate the regression with storm damages in 1994–2002 and 2003–
12 as additional control variables. Even with these controls, I find that municipal 
utilities spend .032 - (-.439) = 47 percent more per mile on distribution than 
investor-owned utilities (see Table 5).
I estimate the same type of regressions with the percentage of distribution lines 
underground as the dependent variable. Investor-owned utilities have 8 percent 
more distribution lines underground (thus almost twice the percentage of dis-
tribution lines underground) as municipal utilities. Further, utilities in more 
densely populated areas have a higher percentage of their distribution lines un-
derground. However, the results for the subsamples in Table 6 do not indicate 
that investor-owned utilities bury more lines underground. Thus, the ownership- 
type difference in the percentage of lines underground may be purely an artifact 
of increasing returns to scale rather than ownership structure.
In summary, my results support newspaper accounts that claim that municipal 
utilities spend more on maintenance of distribution lines than do investor-owned 
utilities. However, my results also indicate that municipal utilities are not neces-
sarily better prepared for storms, since they have a smaller percentage of their 
distribution lines underground, perhaps because of their smaller size.
4.2. Power Usage Sample
To estimate the overall effect of storm preparedness on quality of service, I ex-
amine changes in electricity consumption that follow major storms. I estimate 
three regressions of the following form:
 ( ) ln l( ) ( )3 1 2 3
1
1
D = + + + + D-
=-
åqusyt y s o u o um usyt m
m
sa a a b gDDamages ndusyt ,  (3)
with residential electricity consumption per customer, retail sales, and employ-
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ment as the dependent variable (qusyt ). Thus, I include the current value of dam-
ages as well as a lag and a lead. These variables are interacted with the mode of 
ownership of the utility. For instance, when the dependent variable is residential 
electricity consumption, the coefficients b-1Public ,  b0Public ,  and b1Public ,  describe the 
percentage changes in electricity consumption by a municipal utility that occur 
the month before the storm, the month of the storm, and the month after. These 
coefficients are plotted in Figure 3 and provide evidence of my main result.
Residential electricity consumption for municipal utilities declines by 1.2–2.4 
percent the month of the storm and the following month. For investor-owned 
utilities, electricity consumption declines by .3 percent the month after the storm. 
Figure 3. Effects of a major storm
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Finally, electricity consumption for cooperatives decreases by .3–.6 percent the 
month of the storm and the following month. Decreases in employment are small 
in magnitude for cooperatives and municipal utilities (.0001–.07 percent) but 
larger for investor-owned utilities (.8 percent the month after the storm). Finally, 
retail consumption declines slightly the month of the storm and then recovers the 
following month.
Thus, a major storm is most likely to reduce electricity sales in areas covered by 
municipal utilities. Further, this reduction appears to be due to a change in the 
supply of electricity rather than a change in demand since reductions in employ-
ment and retail sales are of small magnitude.
Table 7 reports these results in regression format, in which Damages is the sum 
of storm damages the month of the storm and the following month. To simplify 
the table, I do not include a full lag structure.
Storm damages of 1 percent of personal income are associated with a .07 per-
cent decrease in residential electricity consumption the month of the storm and 
the following month. When I interact damages with the mode of ownership, I 
find that storm damages of 1 percent of personal income reduce residential elec-
tricity consumption for municipal utilities by .51 + 1.34 = 1.85 percent but 
have no effect on residential electricity consumption for investor-owned utilities. 
Storm damages of 1 percent of personal income also reduce nonresidential elec-
tricity consumption for municipal utilities by .7 percent but have no effect on 
nonresidential consumption for investor-owned utilities.
These results may be driven by decreases in electricity demand following a 
storm. It is possible that demand decreases by a greater amount in areas served 
by municipal utilities, compared with areas served by investor-owned utilities. 
I attempt to address this concern by examining the effect of storm damages on 
retail sales and employment. When I estimate equation (3) with retail sales and 
employment as the dependent variables, I do not find a statistically significant de-
crease in these variables following a storm in areas served by municipal utilities. 
This suggests that the decline in electricity sales in areas served by municipal util-
ities is not driven by ownership-type differences in changes in electricity demand.
I argued that ownership type was determined in the past and should be most 
closely correlated with past rather than contemporaneous county-level character-
istics. This suggests the use of past municipal ownership as an instrument for cur-
rent municipal ownership. For municipal utilities, my instrument is an indicator 
variable for whether the utility is listed in Federal Power Commission (1946). For 
investor-owned utilities and cooperatives, the instrument is the fraction of their 
residential customers who live in cities that had a municipal utility in 1946.30 The 
30 I examined all cities that had a municipal utility in 1946 and had a population of at least 2,000 in 
2000. I then determined the electric utility provider for that city and used this information to deter-
mine the percentage of an investor-owned utility’s or cooperative’s residential customers that were 
served by a municipal utility in 1946. For instance, the Central Louisiana Electric Company provides 
electricity to Opelousas, which in 2000 had a population of 22,860 and had a municipal utility in 
1946. Since the Central Louisiana Electric Company has 200,000 residential customers and, on aver-
age, there are 2.52 individuals per residential customer, the percentage of its customers that used to 
be served by a municipal utility is 2.52 × 22,860/200,000.
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instrumental variables estimates are similar to my prior findings: storm damages 
of 1 percent of personal income reduce residential sales for municipal utilities 
by .48 + 1.57 = 2.05 percent. Further, ownership type in the past strongly cor-
relates with current ownership type, as demonstrated by a first-stage F-statistic of 
274. The results in Tables 5 and 6 also remain unchanged when I use the instru-
mental variables approach.
Nonetheless, these results may still be driven by ownership-type differences in 
storm damages. I attempt to address this concern by excluding utilities in areas 
that had unusually high levels of damages between 1996 and 1998 from the sam-
ple. To further address this concern, I control for damages caused by a tropical 
storm and interact damages with income per capita, population density, and the 
average value of a house.31 I find greater decreases in residential electricity con-
sumption in more rural areas following a storm, but the other variables do not 
have statistically significant effects. Further, the inclusion of these variables does 
not qualitatively change the results.
To provide additional evidence that the results are not driven by a correlation 
between the nature of the storms and the mode of ownership, I reestimate the 
regressions excluding the observations of one state at a time. The magnitude of 
the coefficients is the largest if I exclude Tennessee and the smallest if I exclude 
Utah from the sample. Nonetheless, all 51 regressions give qualitatively the same 
findings.
4.3. Additional Findings
I find greater decreases in electricity consumption following major storms in 
areas served by municipal utilities. In this section, I examine whether these find-
ings are driven by characteristics of municipal utilities other than their owner-
ship type. The regressions in this section include the interaction between popu-
lation density and storm damages, since I find this variable to affect changes in 
electricity consumption.
First, municipal utilities in the sample are smaller than investor-owned utilities 
(see Table 4). It is possible that larger utilities are better at dealing with storms; 
for instance, they may use crews from unaffected areas to restore electricity ser-
vice in the affected areas. If this is the case, the poor performance of municipal 
utilities may be due to their size rather than a lack of managerial incentives. For 
this reason, Table 8 examines the impact of storms on residential electricity con-
sumption using the interaction of storm damages and the log of lagged yearly 
residential electricity consumption. The inclusion of this additional variable does 
not qualitatively affect the results.
A more direct way to control for utility size is to restrict the sample to investor- 
owned, municipal, and cooperative utilities that are roughly the same size. In Ta-
ble 9, I estimate the impact of storm damages on residential electricity consump-
tion for utilities that have 1,000–50,000 residential customers and obtain similar 
31 To conserve space, the regression with housing values is not included in Table 7.
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results. I also obtain similar results when I restrict the sample to utilities with 
10,000–100,000 residential customers or 20,000–200,000 residential customers. 
When controlling for utility size, I must take into account that municipal utilities 
are located in areas that experience greater decreases in electricity demand fol-
lowing a storm. For this reason, I examine the effect of storm damages on retail 
sales for the three different utility sizes. In all three subsamples, the changes in re-
tail sales in areas with municipal utilities are not significantly different from those 
in areas with investor-owned utilities.32
Second, utilities differ in whether they generate or buy the electricity they dis-
tribute. Investor-owned utilities self-generate a higher fraction of the power they 
sell, compared with municipal utilities. Thus, the better storm-related perfor-
mance of investor-owned utilities could be explained by a greater control of their 
electricity supply. For this reason, in Table 8, I estimate the impact of storms on 
residential electricity consumption using the interaction of storm damages and 
the percentage of electricity that is self-generated. The coefficient for this addi-
tional variable is statistically insignificant, and its inclusion does not qualitatively 
affect the results.
A more direct way to control for the degree of vertical integration is to split the 
sample into utilities that purchase all their electricity and those that self-generate 
some of their electricity. For utilities that purchase all their electricity (pure dis-
tribution), I find that storm damages amounting to 1 percent of personal income 
reduce municipal utilities’ residential electricity consumption by .53 + 2.73 = 
3.26 percent but have no effect on investor-owned utilities (see Table 10). For 
utilities that generate some of their electricity (vertical integration), I do not find 
any differences in changes in electricity consumption between municipal and 
investor-owned utilities. Because I must take into account that these results are 
due to differences in changes in electricity demand, I examine the effect of storm 
damages on retail sales for pure-distribution utilities and for vertically integrated 
utilities. The coefficient estimates suggest that demand effects cannot explain the 
entire decrease in electricity consumption in areas served by municipal utilities 
that purchase all their electricity.33
Third, not all states regulate municipal utilities. Thus, the worse performance 
of municipal utilities may be due to lack of regulatory control. Alternatively, reg-
ulation may worsen storm preparedness, and the performance of municipal util-
ities might be even worse if they were all regulated.34 For this reason, I estimate 
the impact of storms on residential electricity consumption using the interaction 
32 For instance, for utilities with 1,000–50,000 customers, the change in retail sales is -1.27 per-
cent for municipal utilities and -.79 percent for investor-owned utilities. These numbers are not 
statistically different from one another (p-value = .5).
33 Note that the coefficient estimates for cooperatives are very large in magnitude. However, these 
results are based on the very small number of vertically integrated cooperatives for which I have re-
tail sales information.
34 For instance, Connecticut Light and Power’s lack of preparedness for Hurricane Irene and the 
October nor’easter was blamed on the state regulatory agency’s failure to authorize enough funding 
for vegetation management (Davies Consulting 2012).
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of storm damages and an indicator for whether the utility is subject to the state 
regulatory commission. Even with this additional variable, I find a greater de-
crease in electricity consumption in areas covered by municipal utilities (Table 
8). Further, I find greater reductions in electricity consumption in areas served by 
municipal uilities following a storm when states regulate municipal utilities (ver-
sus when states do not regulate municipal utilities).
The greater decrease in electricity consumption in states with regulation may 
be due to demand rather than supply effects. For instance, electricity demand 
may decrease by a greater amount in states that regulate municipal utilities if they 
are more likely to issue mandatory evacuations before a storm. For this reason, 
I reestimate the same regression with retail sales and employment as the depen-
dent variables. I find that employment decreases less in states that regulate mu-
nicipal utilities and find no difference in changes in retail sales across regulatory 
types (Table 8).35 Thus, the effect of regulation on electricity consumption is most 
likely to be a supply effect; that is, regulated municipal utilities are more likely 
than nonregulated municipal utilities to have outages following storms.
5. Conclusion
Alleged lack of storm preparation by investor-owned utilities has led to popu-
lar support for an expansion of municipal electrical services following the 1998 
ice storm in upstate New York, Hurricane Irene, and Superstorm Sandy (Singer 
2012; Cardwell 2013; Bruun 2009; Janoski 2012). I examined spending on the dis-
tribution system for a sample of 179 investor-owned, 801 cooperative, and 1,437 
municipal utilities in the United States for 1995–2002. Compared with investor- 
owned utilities, municipal utilities spend more on maintenance of distribution 
lines but have a smaller fraction of them underground. Thus, there are several 
reasons why municipal utilities’ higher maintenance expenditures need not lead 
to greater storm preparedness. First, investor-owned utilities have a higher per-
centage of lines underground. Second, the higher distribution expenses may be 
evidence of wasteful spending by municipal utilities rather than better mainte-
nance. Third, the higher distribution expenses of municipal utilities could be evi-
dence that they are too small to benefit from economies of scale.
To examine empirically which utilities have the best performance in response 
to major storms, I examined a stratified random sample of 241 investor-owned, 
96 cooperative, and 94 municipal utilities in the United States for 1999–2012. I 
provided evidence that electricity consumption decreases more when the util-
ity is municipally owned. Thus, the evidence contradicts one of the justifications 
for calls to expand municipal electrical service, namely, the alleged better perfor-
mance of municipal utilities during storms. Prior international evidence reaches 
a similar conclusion, namely, that the privatization of the electric distribution 
network does not lead to more power outages (Fumagalli, Garrone, and Grilli 
35 For instance, the change in employment in municipal utilities that are regulated is -.96 - .11 
+ .29 = -.78 percent.
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2007; Gonzalez-Eiras and Rossi 2007; Hartley 1999). The political process is one 
potential source of government inefficiency. For instance, Boylan (2015) provides 
evidence that the pay for employees in municipal utilities increases the year of 
a mayoral election. Nonetheless, these findings do not necessarily indicate that 
investor-owned utilities are preferable, since prior studies show that municipal 
electric utilities in the United States charge lower prices, even when accounting 
for subsidies (Peltzman 1971; Kwoka 2002).
Methodologically, I provided a novel proxy to measure power outages: the 
difference between monthly electricity consumption and the previous year’s 
monthly electricity sales. To validate the measure, I found it to be correlated with 
outages recorded on the Department of Energy’s form Form OE-417. I also com-
pared changes in monthly electricity sales after a storm to changes in monthly 
employment and monthly retail sales. I did not find electricity sales to move con-
jointly with retail sales and employment. Thus, changes in electricity sales are 
more likely to represent changes in the supply of electricity than changes in the 
demand of electricity.
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